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1 Introduction
Anti-corruption laws forbid trading attractive nominations made by politicians. But
even though interested citizens are not able to buy such spoils, it pays o¤ to be in
good terms with the politicians. Citizens buy tickets to fund-raising events and spend
time with politicians to be remembered when nominations are made. If there are no
restrictions on whom politicians can allocate jobs to, citizens can gain by rubbing
shoulders with several politicians. This is time-consuming both for citizens and for
politicians and results in wasteful network formation. Here, political parties can step
in.
Political parties are powerful gatekeepers in modern democracies. First, citizens
looking for positions of trust, and politicians allocating these, cannot belong to more
than one party. Second, political parties can require their politician members to pass
the nominations to other party members. Thus, parties can reduce wasteful network
formation between citizens and politicians thanks to their ability to sign exclusive
membership contracts. On the other hand, there is an additional linking cost when
parties are present: parties also need to build links to politicians.
We compare network formation with and without the role of the political parties.
We take as our starting point that political parties exist and that politicians distribute
non-ideological spoils, such as make nominations to positions of trust or hire civil
servants who do not make political decisions. We ask whether the gatekeeping role of
the political parties improves e¢ciency in the distribution of such spoils. We also ask
who gains and who loses from the parties meddling in the network formation.
In our model, the party has full control of the network formation within the party.
We focus on the networks used to allocate non-ideological spoils; for concreteness think
of positions of trust in a municipality. In addition to providing exclusivity, political
parties allocate each joining member to a unique politician belonging to the party.
Political parties …rst pay politicians for joining and then sell links to politicians to
rent-seeking citizens. In equilibrium, parties, politicians, and citizens have rational
expectations about the network structure. Equilibrium prices are determined by these
expectations and inter-party competition.
Also in the no-party equilibrium, expectations about the equilibrium network struc-
ture are rational. The equilibrium prices are determined by competition between politi-
cians on one side and citizens on the other side of the market. Given prices, politicians
and citizens choose the number of links they sell and buy, respectively.
The more time citizens or politicians spend rubbing shoulders, the higher the oppor-
tunity cost of time spent doing so. Thus, linking costs are convex and, in equilibrium,
the prices of links are determined by marginal costs.
We …rst derive the equilibrium networking structure and the equilibrium payo¤s in
the no-party and in the party equilibrium. We show that a no-party equilibrium always
exists and that the existence of a party equilibrium depends on the parameters of the
model. We then study the welfare properties of the equilibria. Finally, we study the
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incentive compatibility of the party equilibrium by analyzing whether a single politician
would prefer not to join a party but rather to sell links directly to citizens without party
control.1
We …nd that the net e¤ect of intermediaries on social welfare depends on networking
costs, the value of lucrative nominations, and the relative numbers of politicians, citi-
zens and parties. Therefore, welfare-maximizing government may well …nd it optimal
to promote the involvement of political parties in some cases, and actively discourage
it in others.
Notice that allocating one rent-seeking citizen to each politician would minimize the
cost of network formation. Hypothetically, parties have two ways to accomplish this:
either by selling upcoming nominations within the party or by allowing in only one citi-
zen per each nominating politician. Yet, so as to the selling policy, anti-corruption laws
bind also political parties. At the same time, pre-commitment not to take additional
members is prohibited since this would violate equal rights to political participation.2
We also …nd that politicians would be better o¤ if political parties were not involved
in the distribution of rents while citizens may gain from their presence, despite the fact
that parties charge membership fees from citizens and transfer money to politicians!
Even so, a party equilibrium may be incentive-compatible in that no single politician
would …nd it optimal not to link with the party, provided that others do.
Our model has common features with several strands of literature. First, we suppose
that for a citizen to receive a rent from a project initiated by a politician, a connection
must be established between the two. This relates the current paper to the literature
on cooperative networks, pioneered by Jackson and Wolinsky (1996). However, in our
model agents may trade in the right to control network formulation. This di¤erentiates
our model from Jackson and Wolinsky (1996).
Second, in our model, the citizens compete for rents initiated by politicians as
in rent-seeking and lobbying contests literature (Tullock (1967, 1980), Bernheim and
Whinston (1986), Baye, Kovenock and de Vries (1993) and Grossman and Helpman
(1994)). Yet, there are two major di¤erences. In our model, links are costly for both
and endogenous, and require mutual consent. Payments are made in exchange for
establishing links. In rent-seeking and lobbying literature, links are exogenous and
costless, and payments are bids in an auction or in a contest. Throughout the analysis,
we assume that anti-corruption laws work3. Therefore, we have implicitly in mind
a modern democracy with relatively low level of corruption. Previous literature on
1We refer only to the dimension of allocating the non-ideological spoils. Indeed, the role of the
political parties in distributing positions of trust and governments jobs has varied both between
countries and over time.
2We could generate the motivation not to restrict network formation by assuming that some citizens
want to join parties to seek for rents, while others for ideological reasons. Those joining parties for
ideological reasons favor a no-restriction policy.
3The inability of politicians and citizens to trade nominations when these arise could result from
outside monitoring or from there being a fraction of honest citizens and politicians who would report
asking or o¤ering bribes, provided that punishments for corruption are su¢ciently high.
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contests has already analyzed extensively the case where anti-corruption laws can be
circumvented.
Third, our model is related to two strands of intermediation literature, the middle-
men literature (Rubinstein and Wolinsky (1987)) on the one hand, and the literature
on two-sided markets (Rochet and Tirole (2003), Armstrong (2004)) on the other hand.
In our model, the intermediaries, or the platforms, are the political parties. Our model
di¤ers from these models most importantly in that the intermediary plays a useful role
by restricting the activity between the two sides of its market.
Fourth, our explanation complements previous e¢ciency rationales for the promi-
nent role of political parties. For example, Alesina (1988) and Alesina and Spear (1988)
…nd that political parties may reduce policy ‡uctuations, compared with the case in
which subsequent cohorts of competing politicians with di¤erent preferences would en-
gage in one-shot electoral competition. Caillaud and Tirole (2002) show that political
parties may make up voters’information de…cit by designing and endorsing electoral
platforms. These previous contributions leave the puzzle of why intermediaries arise
also in cases where they do not reduce the time spent on searching, provide additional
information, or solve various commitment problems. For example, it is questionable to
what extent a political party would provide new information when …lling positions of
trust or public jobs in a small municipality. Yet, even these positions and many other
jobs are typically earmarked to di¤erent political parties. Our explanation for the role
of a political party applies even in cases where these explanations fail.
There are two features which separate politics and political parties from other areas
of intermediation. The …rst one concerns the legal framework. Anti-corruption laws
restrict the ability of politicians and citizens to enter even into informal contracts on
allocating projects in exchange of payments. In other areas of intermediation (like the
market of goods and ideas) the two sides are typically allowed to enter into private
contracts on the underlying goods or services, rather than just on linking together.
The second di¤erence is in the services that the intermediary provides. In previous
literature, intermediaries are used only if these provide additional services in reducing
search costs between the two sides of market, information revelation of the underlying
good or economizing transaction costs. Political parties need not provide any of these
services; the service they provide is exclusivity -one cannot be a member of several
political parties.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the model. Section 3 analyzes
equilibrium payo¤s and linking in the absence of parties, and section 4 in their presence.
Section 5 explores whether politicians prefer a network with or without parties, and
whether an eventual party equilibrium is incentive compatible. Section 6 presents a
welfare comparison, and section 7 concludes.
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2 Model
There are ?? agents of type ?, and there are three types ? 2 f?????g. Type ? is called
a politician, ? = 1? ???? ??, type ? is called a citizen, ? = 1? ???? ?? and type ? is called
a party boss, ? = 1? ???? ?? . The politician receives a project with probability ?. The
project generates a surplus ? to the citizen who receives it. This surplus may be …xed
by law, like salaries in political nominations and compensations for positions of trust.4
Each politician is indi¤erent to which citizen to pass the project. Also, each citizen
is indi¤erent from which politician she receives the project. Yet, for politician ? to be
able to pass the project to citizen ?, there has to be a direct link between them. Party
bosses can connect to citizens indirectly, through politicians, but they need direct links
to politicians. Note that our framework allows analyzing politics at di¤erent levels. At
the national level, party bosses would be leaders of the national parties. At municipal
level, they would be local leaders and politicians could be then, for example, members
of the municipal council. Whichever the level, politicians require having a direct access
to their party boss. We take the identity of party bosses as exogenous5. Citizens can
be interpreted as individuals interested in positions distributed by elected politicians or
they can be interpreted as representatives of corporations interested in public projects
the allocation of which depends on decisions made by politicians.
The strength of a link between agents ? and ?0 is denoted ???0. Obviously, the
strength of the link from ? to ?0 must equal the strength of the link from ?0 to ?,
thus, ???0 = ??0?. Maintaining a link requires time, and may require other costs. A
decreasing marginal productivity in other activities, or an increasing marginal utility
of leisure, implies that the marginal cost of time spent on networking is increasing.
Furthermore, networking with competing agents simultaneously may pose additional
challenges. For example, a politician who seeks to extract contributions from competing
contractors may need to spend more time in convincing these of the bene…ts of giving.
To capture these features, we model the marginal costs of networking as increasing. A
cost for ? of maintaining number ? of links is
1
2
??2
where ? is a positive cost parameter independent of player’s type.
The number of links in a network without political parties need not be an integer.
Formally, the width of each link is between zero and one, zero implying no link at all
and one implying a full link. The width of a link can be thought to be proportional to
the time spent in maintaining the link. The probability weight that each link receives
when politician allocates projects to citizens is proportional to the width of the link.
4All the results would remain the same if also the politician would receive certain surplus, in case
a project is ful…lled.
5In a richer framework, we could model overlapping generations of politicians, with all young
politicians being of type A and one of the old politicians becoming party boss in the second.
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The width of potential links with political parties, on the other hand, is restricted
to be either zero or one. This re‡ects the di¤erences between the formal relationships
with political parties and the informal relationships between citizens and politicians.
We assume that the number of agents is su¢ciently large that citizens never …nd it
attractive to maintain full links to all politicians.
3 Networks without Political Parties
Assume that there are more citizens than politicians, 0 ? ?? ? ?? . In this section, we
assume that the political parties do not participate in the network formation between
politicians and citizens looking for projects that they distribute. There are ? times
more citizens than politicians, ?? = ???? ? 2 f2? 3? ???g. If there are several citizens
linked to a politician, we assume that the politician allocates the project randomly, so
that the probability that each citizen is chosen is proportional to the width of the link.
Thus the probability of getting the project from politician ? equals
?
???P
?=1???????
???
In the special case in which the width of each link is one, each citizen would then have
an equal probability to receive the project.
A citizen has to pay politician ? a reward, ??, for maintaining a full link. If the link is
only partial, then the reward is reduced proportionally. Note that this is a gross price,
and it has to compensate the politician for her marginal cost of linking. In addition to
paying politicians ?? for maintaining links, citizens have to pay their own linking costs.
Citizens are able to pay politicians for networking even if they cannot pay for
projects. For example, citizens interested in nominations can give campaign contri-
butions to candidates or volunteer work. Explicitly requiring a politician to assign a
nomination in exchange for such contribution, on the other hand, would be considered
bribing and not lobbying. Citizens are only allowed to pay for access to the politician.
The expected payo¤ of a citizen reads6X
?
?
???P
????
?¡
X
?
????? ¡ ?
2
(
X
?
???)2
The politician’s maximization problem is as follows
max
??1????? 1??
f
X
?
????? ¡ ?
2
(
X
?
???)2g
6This formulation coincides with Tullock (1980) with ? = 1. Yet, the decision variable is not cost
of e¤ort, but rather, the number of links and the cost of linking is not linear but convex in the number
of links.
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resulting in …rst order conditions
?? ¡ ?(
X
?
???) = 0
for ? = 1? ???? ?? . We assume that each citizen acts atomistically7 taking as given the
reward ?? and the aggregate number of links that each politician has to citizens??? and
maximizes
max
?1?????? ???
f
X
?
?
???
???
?¡
X
?
????? ¡ ?
2
(
X
?
???)2g
Thus, the …rst order conditions write
??
???
¡ ?? ¡ ?
X
?
??? = 0? (1)
for ? = 1? ???? ??.
It is easy to see that each politician is indi¤erent so as to which citizens are linked to
her. She only cares about the aggregate amount of links to citizens, ???. Also, as long
as linking rewards and the aggregate amount of links, ???, are equal across politicians,
each citizen is indi¤erent so as to how to allocate the links between politicians. All
that matters is her aggregate amount of links, ???. Since linking cost functions are
convex and they equal across politicians and citizens, the number of links equal across
politicians, on the one hand, and across citizens, on the other hand. Equilibrium
rewards equal the politicians’marginal linking cost. Thus, citizens equate their own
marginal linking cost and the equilibrium reward, ?
P
??? + ????, to the expected rent
from linking, ??????
, where ???? is the equilibrium mass of links from a politician to
citizens and ???? is the equilibrium reward. Furthermore, we denote ????the amount
of links that a citizen has to politicians in equilibrium.
This allows us to derive the no-party equilibrium8. We summarize it as Proposition
1:
Proposition 1 In the no-party equilibrium, the supply of links by each politician is
???? =
r
???
(? + 1)?
; (2)
the demand for links by each citizen is
???? =
r
??
?(? + 1)?
; (3)
7Appendix A shows how the equilibrium derived here corresponds to an equilibrium of a dynamic
game. Notice, that the atomisticity implies that there is no strategic own-side membership externality
e¤ect (see Rochet and Tirole, 2004) even if such an e¤ect is present in our model non-strategically.
8We use the superscript ? for the equilibrium values of endogenous variables in the no-party
equilibrium. Similarly, superscript ? is used for the party equilibrium in section 4.
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and the reward for links from citizen to politician is
?? =
r
????
(? + 1)
? (4)
Proof. See appendix.
It is now straightforward to calculate the equilibrium surpluses. These are summa-
rized in proposition 2:
Proposition 2 The equilibrium payo¤ for the politician is
??? =
???
2(? + 1)
(5)
which is increasing in ?? ? and ??
The expected equilibrium payo¤ for the citizen is
??? =
??
2?(? + 1)
(6)
which is increasing in ? and ? and decreasing in ?.
Proof. See appendix.
The politician bene…ts from the scarcity of politicians, whereas the opposite holds
for the citizen. As the relative number of citizens per politician increases, the demand
of links of each citizen decreases but the demand per politician increases. Thus, due
to marginal cost pricing and convex costs, the pro…t of the politician increases. Yet,
for the citizen the strength of the link per each politician decreases and, thus, so does
the probability of getting the project. Yet, the reward that needs to be paid is higher.
Hence, the payo¤ for the citizen decreases.
Surprisingly, the cost of maintaining links enters neither the politician’s surplus nor
that of the citizen9. This implies that the e¢ciency gains due to reduction of the cost
of maintaining links are wasted in additional network formation.
Notice that for any parameter values of the model the equilibrium number of links is
positive and both the citizen and the politician receive a positive surplus. This implies
the following corollary that establishes the existence of no-party equilibrium.
Proposition 3 For any feasible parameter values of the model, there exists a no-party
equilibrium.
9This result is not in the core of our analysis. It may be due to functional forms and may not be
robust to other speci…cations.
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4 Networks with Political Parties
In this section, we introduce political parties as intermediaries that join together politi-
cians and citizens. The service that the parties provide turns out to be exclusivity of
links: no politician or citizen can link to a member of another party. This reduces
wasteful multiplication of links to each politician. Yet, there are costs to this as well,
since each citizen must now link to the political party in addition to the politicians.
We now have also C types who serve as intermediaries. Party bosses exert control
rights over their party (or its local unit in the municipality interpretation). They
maximize the party’s surplus, net of their own linking costs. We do not take stance
whether party bosses would keep the surplus, or part of it, for private consumption,
or if they use the surplus for ideological purposes. Assume that there are ? politicians
per each party boss, where ? 2 f2? 3? ???g Therefore, ?? = ??? and as ?? = ???,
?? = ???? .
Assumption 1. Each citizen pays a reward, ???, to the party boss and
each politician gets a reward, ???, from the party boss. The party boss
receives the right to control and design the network of all the politicians
and citizens linked with it on the condition that the party bears all the
linking costs.10
Assumption 2. Political parties, represented by party bosses, sign ex-
clusive contracts that state that citizens linked to them are not able to sign
up with other political parties. The political parties cannot commit not to
sign contracts with additional politicians and citizens.
Assumption 3. When citizens make their linking decisions, they know
how many politicians belong to each party.
Assumption 4. Keeping up the links between politicians and citizens
requires e¤ort or resources, like in the case with no political parties. Also,
links between party bosses and politicians require maintaining.
Assumption 5. The party bosses play the active role, making take-it-or-
leave-it o¤ers to the politicians and citizens.
Assumption 6. There must be a direct link between the politician and
the citizen who carries out the project initiated by the politician.
There is an indirect link between ? and ?0, when there is a third agent ?00 with whom
both ? and ?0 are linked to. We denote an indirect link between ? and ?0 by ???0. We
focus on an equilibrium where all politicians and citizens are party members -every
10If the party would not bear the linking costs, then party boss would have an incentive to require
politicians to build more links ex post than they have agreed on ex ante.
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politician and every citizen has a direct or an indirect link to a party.11 For notational
simplicity, the number of links that a agent of type ? has to ?0 types is denoted by the
same variable for all agents of the same type. This is restrictive in general but, as in the
no-party equilibrium, it turns out to be a a property of any equilibrium: all agents of
the same type have equal number of links and pay and receive equal payments. There
will be no direct payments between politicians and citizens since the party regulates
links.12 Yet, by assumption 6, the structure of the network within a party always
includes direct links between politicians and citizens.
The party ?’s pro…ts is
??(???????) = (??? +???)[??? ¡
?
2
(??? +???)2] (7)
¡(??? + ???)[??? +
?
2
(??? +???)2]
¡ ?
2
(??? +???)2
By assumption, there must be a direct link between the politician and the citizen who
carry out the project. This being the case, the optimal structure of the network is such
that a party boss constructs a network where the party boss is directly linked to the
politicians and each politician is linked directly to citizens. There are no direct links
between the party boss and the citizens. Thus, (7) reduces to
??(???????) = ???[??? ¡
?
2
]
¡???[??? + ?
2
(??? + 1)2]
¡?
2
(???)2
Here ??? and ??? are payments received or paid by the party for each link to citizens
and to politicians. These may generally be positive or negative. A payment is made
independently of the type of the link but a cost of link is born only from direct links.
The party carries out the politician’s linking costs. This is the last term of the party’s
payo¤.
11In section 5.2, we study whether a politician has an incentive not to join a party and link to
citizens without the control of the party. We do not consider equilibria in which the value of the
project is so low that not all citizens are willing to link to a party even if all politicians are party
members.
12Note that often citizens pay to the party in the form of volunteer work. Our framework could
be generalized to allow for this, without changing the qualitative results. Then the interpretation
would be the following. Each citizen pays to the party in the form of work up to the point in which
the marginal cost for citizen equals the marginal bene…t for the party. The di¤erence between the
monetarized value of this e¢cient work e¤ort and the equilibrium payment is settled in money. Party
bosses may then let citizens (or part of them) to work directly for the politician, thus transferring
part of the compensation to the politician in kind.
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Equally, the citizen’s expected payo¤ is
?? = ???¡ ???
The probability that a given link results in a project is
?? = ?
???
???
Finally, a politician linked to a party receives a surplus equalling
?? = ????
In the party equilibrium, each citizen and each politician is linked to a party. The
next propositions 4 to 6 characterize party equilibria
Proposition 4 In any party equilibrium, each party boss is linked with ? politicians
and ?? citizens. The number of direct links are ???? = ?, ???? = 1, ???? = 1 ? ???? =
?, ???? = 0 = ????.
Proof. In the appendix.
Also, we can derive the equilibrium rewards paid by the party and the citizen and
the equilibrium probability that a citizen gets the project.
Proposition 5 In any party equilibrium, each party pays for each politician a reward
???? =
?(?2 + ? ¡ 2?¡ 2)
2
(8)
and each citizen pays the party a reward
???? = ?(? + 2) (9)
for the right to link with a politician. The equilibrium probability of getting the project
is
??? =
?
?
Proof. In the appendix.
The equilibrium network structure is based on two principles. First, the party is
forced to build up direct links between the citizens and the politicians. This being
the case, it is less costly to the party boss to build his own links to the citizens via a
politician rather than directly. Moreover, allocating equitable numbers of citizens to
politicians minimizes the cost of linking.
Second, competition drives the bene…t from an additional link equal to its marginal
cost. Having a unique market reward and inequitable number of links would violate the
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condition of zero marginal net bene…t. The one with less links can apply the cheapest
network structure described above and get the same reward with a lower marginal cost.
Hence, number of links for any two agents of the same kind in the market must be
the same. The rewards are such that the parties are indi¤erent between selling an
additional link to a citizen, or buying an additional link to a politician, and sticking
to the equilibrium number of links.
Notice yet, that if there is no linking cost between a citizen and a party boss, the
same connections could be built with lower cost by linking the party bosses and the
politicians via the citizens. Yet, in order to gain exclusive control over the links of the
politician, the party boss …rst builds direct links to them.
Due to the marginal cost pricing and the fact that each politician is allocated an
equal number of citizens, the reward paid by the citizen to the party increases in ?,
the number of citizens per politician, and in ?? the linking cost parameter, (9).
Again, due to marginal cost pricing, the reward that a party pays to the politician
equals the rewards from ? citizens linked to the marginal politician, less the marginal
politician’s costs of linking to the ? citizens and the cost of those citizens to link to the
politician, less the party’s marginal cost of linking to the politicians (29). The surplus
per politician, ????? ¡ ?2(? + 1)2 ¡ ? ?2 , increases in ? and in ?? On the other hand, the
party’s marginal cost of linking to the politicians increases in ? and in ? since each
party gets ? politicians in equilibrium. Hence, the equilibrium reward to politician
decreases in ? and increases in ?. As both the gross surplus per each politician and the
marginal cost of linking to them increase in ?, its net e¤ect on the reward that political
parties pay politicians is open, a priori.
Next, we characterize the equilibrium payo¤s.
Proposition 6 In any party equilibrium, the equilibrium payo¤s are
??? =
??(?+ 1)
2
(10)
??? =
?
2
(?2 + ? ¡ 2?¡ 2) (11)
??? =
??
?
¡ ?(? + 2) (12)
Proof. These follow from inserting the equilibrium demands and rewards into the
surplus expressions.
The comparative statics of these equilibrium payo¤s are straightforward
11
Proposition 7 The comparative statics of the equilibrium payo¤s are
????
??
? 0?
????
??
? 0
????
??
? 0?
????
??
? 0?
????
??
? 0
????
??
? 0 ?
????
??
? 0
The following corollary identi…es cases where the citizen’s party equilibrium payo¤
is higher than her no-party equilibrium payo¤
Corollary 1 The citizen’s party equilibrium payo¤ is higher than her no-party equi-
librium payo¤ if
??
?
¸ 2(? + 2)(? + 1)?
(2? + 1)
(13)
We found two countervailing e¤ects of the linking cost ? on the party’s equilibrium
payo¤. Proposition 7 shows that the e¤ect of linking cost on politicians’equilibrium
payo¤ is positive. The e¤ect through the higher rewards paid by the citizens dominates
the e¤ect of higher marginal linking cost to politicians.
Proposition 7 reveals an interest con‡ict concerning the cost parameter. Politicians
and political parties actually prefer a higher cost of networking, while citizens prefer
a lower one. The seemingly counterintuitive result that some agents bene…t from an
increasing transaction cost follows from competition between politicians. When selling
links to the citizens, the political parties charge a reward, ???? , equal to the marginal
cost of adding one additional link. A lower value of the cost parameter would result
in …ercer competition between political parties, and such reductions in rents from
politicians to political parties would also result in lower equilibrium payments to them.
This suggests, that parties and politicians might object technological innovations that
might reduce the costs of networking -such as political participation via internet.
What remains is to characterize the existence of equilibria:13
Proposition 8 There is a party equilibrium with ??? ¸ 0 where each citizen and each
politician links to a unique party if and only if
??
?
¸ ?(? + 2) ¸ 2?+ 2 + ?? (14)
13We suppose that in equilibrium the parties do not receive payments from the politicians, ??? ¥ 0.
The politicians would be willing to pay such a reward only if they can be forced not to stay out of
the parties, since staying out and letting any partner link to them for free would give them a higher
payo¤.
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that is if and only if the relative number of citizens per politician is not too small or
too large, the linking cost and the number of politicians per party boss is su¢ciently
small, and the expected rent is su¢ciently large.
Proof. These follow from the assumption that ??? ¸ 0 and from the requirement
that ??? ¸ 0.
The politicians’and citizens’individual rationality constraints create bounds for the
number of citizens per politician. The condition ?2 + ? ¸ 2?+2 is a requirement that
when a politician links with a party, the reward that the party pays to the politician
???? =
?(?2 + ? ¡ 2?¡ 2)
2
? (15)
Such a condition is in line with what we observe in politics: political parties typi-
cally pay their politicians in the form of campaign contributions etc. rather than the
other way round, and members pay parties membership fees rather than parties paying
members.
As long as the number of citizens per politician is su¢ciently high relative to the
number of politicians per party, ?(? + 1) ¸ 2? + 2, the party pays a reward to the
politician and carries the politician’s linking costs. The politician gets a positive payo¤
anyway? All we have to worry about is citizen’s surplus. The expression ??? ¡ ?(? + 2)
re‡ects the surplus of the citizen in the party equilibrium for a given number of citizens
per politician (see equation (10)). Increasing the number of citizens per politician
su¢ciently makes the citizen’s expected surplus negative.
Combining the existence conditions with (13), we notice that it is possible that
the citizen prefers the no-party equilibrium to the party equilibrium or vice versa.
Another point of interest, which we report as a corollary to proposition 8 is that, in the
party equilibrium, the number of citizens per politician is smaller whenever the party
equilibrium exists.
Corollary 2 If the party equilibrium exists, then the number of citizens per politician
is smaller in the party equilibrium than in the no-party equilibrium
Proof. By proposition 4, the number of citizens per politician in the party equilib-
rium equals ?. By proposition 2, the number of citizens per politician in the no-party
equilibrium is
q
???
(?+1)? . Thus, the claim amounts to
? ?
r
???
(? + 1)?
which is equivalent to
?(? + 1) ?
??
?
which holds if the party equilibrium exists by proposition 8.
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As in the economy as a whole, also in each party, there are ? times more citizens
than politicians by proposition 4. Thus, if the party let its politicians and citizens
freely interact with the only restriction that none of its politicians or citizens could
interact with non-members, the equilibrium payo¤s would not be a¤ected vis-à-vis the
no-party equilibrium. Yet, the party enforces the network design within the party so
that each citizen is linked to one politician only. The number of links per politician
? in the party-equilibrium is always smaller than the number of links per politician in
the no-party-equilibrium,
q
???
(?+1)? .
5 Incentive Compatibility and the Politicians’Pref-
erence for the Party Equilibrium
In the equilibrium derived above, the party provides linking services for the citizens and
the politicians. The individual rationality constraints guarantee that each politician
and each citizen rather links to the party than remains inactive. Yet, on the one hand,
we do not know whether the politicians prefer the party equilibrium to the no-party
equilibrium. If the politicians were able to make a collective binding decision not to link
with any political parties, could they gain? On the other hand, given that all the other
politicians are linked to a party, each politician might prefer not linking with a party.
Requiring that no politician prefers not linking with a party unilaterally provides an
incentive compatibility condition for the party equilibrium.
In this section, we study whether the politicians prefer linking directly to citizens.
We …rst study the pro…tability of a coordinated and collective shift by the politicians
from the party equilibrium to the no-party equilibrium. Second, we study the prof-
itability of a unilateral deviation of a single politician from linking with a party to
linking with citizens directly when all other politicians remain linked with the political
parties.
Even if the politicians prefer not to link with the political parties, the political
parties might be able to make it unattractive for the politicians not to link to them. If
not one politician alone but all together prefer linking to political parties, the structure
is similar to that of a prisoner’s dilemma game: even though the utility of a deviating
politician exceeds that of politicians sticking to using political parties, the politicians’
payo¤ in the party equilibrium exceeds their utility in the no-party equilibrium. We
show that such dilemma structure never arises.
5.1 Politicians’preferences concerning the equilibria
We next identify which of the equilibria is the politicians’preferred equilibrium. Politi-
cians prefer the no-party equilibrium to the party equilibrium if the surplus in the
former, (5), is greater than the surplus in the latter, (11). Hence, the condition that
each politician prefers the no-party equilibrium is
14
???
2(? + 1)
¸ ?
2
(?2 + ? ¡ 2?¡ 2) (16)
When (16) holds, the no-party equilibrium is preferred by the politicians. The next
proposition shows that the politicians prefer the no-party equilibrium.
Proposition 9 The politicians prefer the no-party equilibrium.
Proof. In the appendix.
This result is not too surprising in the light of corollary 2. The number of links per
politician ? in the party-equilibrium is always smaller than the number of links per
politician in the no-party-equilibrium,
q
???
(?+1)? . But, when competing for the politi-
cians, the parties pay politicians a reward equalling the marginal bene…t of that politi-
cian to the party which on the other hand is just ? times the pro…t that it makes per each
citizen that becomes a member of the party. This latter, on the other hand, is smaller
than what the politician makes for each citizen in the no-party equilibrium since, as
shown above, the number of links per politician is smaller in the party-equilibrium.
5.2 Incentive compatible party equilibrium
If a politician cannot be prevented by other means from not linking with a party and
linking with citizens directly, the equilibrium surplus for a politician has to be greater
than or equal to the surplus if the politician links directly with citizens. Studying a
politician’s incentives to remain linked with a party when all other politicians are linked
with a party is the focus in this subsection. We assume that a deviating politician is
able to make take-it-or-leave-it o¤ers to potential partners. She asks a reward that
citizens must pay to connect to her. The politician is unable to commit not to sell
additional links. Therefore, she sells links until an additional link would give a negative
payo¤ to her. This determines the number of citizens that will connect. In equilibrium,
the citizens anticipate the number of links that a deviating politician would like to sell.
We show that there are cases where the party equilibrium is incentive compatible and
others where it is not.
Proposition 10 There are feasible parameter values for which the party equilibrium
is incentive compatible and others for which it is not.
Proof. The proof is in the appendix.
6 Welfare
The aggregate surplus in the no-party equilibrium, de…ned as ?? , equals
?? = ???? ¡ ?? 1
2
??
?(? + 1)
¡ ?? 1
2
???
(? + 1)
?
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In the party equilibrium, the aggregate surplus ?? equals
?? = ????¡ ?? ?
2
(? + 1)2 ¡ ?? ?
2
¡ ?? ?
2
?2?
The next proposition gives a necessary and a su¢cient condition for the party
equilibrium to create a larger surplus
Proposition 11 ? ? ¸ ?? if and only if ?2 + 3? + ?+ 1 · ???
Proof.
????¡ ?? ?
2
(? + 1)2 ¡ ?? ?
2
¡ ?? ?
2
?2 ¸ ????¡ ?? 1
2
??
?(? + 1)
¡ ??1
2
???
(? + 1)
??
?
2
(?2 + 2? + 1) + ??
?
2
+ ??
?
2
?2 · ??1
2
??
(? + 1)
+ ??
1
2
???
(? + 1)
?? [?
?
2
(?2 + 2? + 1) + ??
?
2
+
?
2
?2] · ?????
2
?2 + 3? + ?+ 1 · ??
?
When (i) the number of politicians per party, ?, (ii) the number of citizens per
politician, ?, and (iii) the linking costs, ?, are su¢ciently small vis-à-vis the citizen’s
expected share of the project, ??, then the intermediation is socially preferred.
Notice, that we have cases when the party equilibrium creates a smaller surplus
even if it exists and cases where the party equilibrium creates a larger surplus and, yet,
the market agents may coordinate on the no-party equilibrium. To see this, suppose
that the second inequality in the existence condition for the party equilibrium, (14)
holds, that is ?(? + 2) ¸ 2? + 2 + ?. This can be achieved, for instance, by setting
? ¸ ? = 2. The …rst inequality in (14) sets a lower bound for ??? . This inequality is far
less stringent than the condition of proposition 11. When the latter holds, so does the
lower bound for ??? in (14). Thus, if we choose large enough
??
? , the party equilibrium
exists and generates a larger surplus than the no party equilibrium. Yet, when we
choose ??? such that 2?+2+? · ?(?+2) · ??? ? ?2+3?+?+1, the party equilibrium
exists but generates a lower surplus than the no-party equilibrium. Thus, depending
on the parameter values of the model, intervention may be needed in order to enforce
the no-party equilibrium or in order to enforce the party equilibrium depending on the
parameter values of the model.
The politicians prefer the no-party equilibrium, and they have an incentive to bring
about institutions to guarantee its emergence. Sometimes, the interest of the social
planner coincides with the interest of the politicians and promoting the emergence of
such institutions may be in the planners interest. Yet, when the party equilibrium
is preferable, the social planner should make every e¤ort to prevent the emergence of
such institutions. Furthermore, even the politician’s individual incentives may render
the party equilibrium unstable for instance if the linking costs are su¢ciently low.
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7 Conclusion
In this paper, we suggest a novel explanation for the role of political parties: politi-
cians distribute rents to other party members only, thus cancelling out the incentive
of non-members to seek rents and spend resources in constructing links to the parties’
politicians. This reduces link formation and enables the party to create value for the
party members.
We take as our starting point anti-corruption laws which forbid citizens from paying
politicians directly for nominations or publicly commissioned projects. These laws still
allow citizens (or …rms) to pay for gaining access to politicians, for example by buying
tickets to fund-raising events, by volunteering, and by making campaign contributions.
Competition for access and politicians’attention results in wasteful network formation,
which political parties may alleviate, when citizens can belong to only one party. Po-
litical parties can reduce network formation costs by attaching each party member to
a given politician, rather than allowing them to build links to several politicians. Sim-
ilarly, political parties require politicians to pass projects to party members attached
to them.
It should be highlighted that anti-corruption laws restrict also the activities of
political parties. These are not allowed to trade in nominations or projects directly,
but only to receive membership payments and allocate funds to politicians’campaigns.
Even political parties are unable to fully eliminate wasteful network formation, as they
cannot commit to restricting the number of citizens they admit as members.14
Even though political parties may save network formation costs, they need not.
There are two reasons for this result which may appear at the …rst glance counterin-
tuitive. First, the use of political parties typically necessitates more formal network
structure (there are only two degrees of strengths of the link, either there is a link
or there is not). Politicians and citizens, on the other hand, may have more informal
links with varying degrees of strength of the link. Second, maintaining links to the
political parties is costly. When parties are present, the network must cover the parties
in addition to politicians and citizens, creating a need for additional links.
The use of political parties improves welfare whenever the linking costs, the number
of politicians per party boss and the number of citizens per politician are su¢ciently
low and the expected rent for the citizen is su¢ciently large. Yet, when the number
of citizens per politicians or the number of politicians per party boss is high, but not
too high to prevent the party equilibrium from emerging, the no-party equilibrium is
socially preferred.
We also …nd that politicians would be better o¤ without political parties while
citizens may gain from their presence, despite the fact that parties charge membership
fees from citizens and transfer money to politicians. This surprising result arises as
14Allowing political parties to pre-commit not to take additional members would disenfranchise
those citizens not belonging to the selected few from fully participating in the political life.
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payments by citizens might be even higher without parties. Even so, a party equilibrium
may be incentive-compatible in that no single politician would …nd it optimal to deviate
from it, provided that others do not. If a party equilibrium results in higher welfare,
the problem of the social planner is to prevent the emergence of politicians’collective
bodies that exist to guarantee the coordination on the no-party equilibrium. If the
party equilibrium results in higher welfare and is not incentive compatible, then the
society may change this by increasing the costs of individual politicians deviating from
it. This may explain, for example, why public money to political campaigns is often
channelled through political parties, rather than directly to politicians.
Our framework raises several topics for further research. First, we could relax the
assumption of e¢cient anti-corruption laws. Previous literature on rent-seeking has
assumed that lobbyists can make politicians payments in exchange for certain poli-
cies. This leaves for future research the intermediate case in which links are the only
channels through which payments can be made to in‡uence policies. Second, we could
endogenize the identity of politicians in the citizen-candidate tradition pioneered by
Osborne and Slivinski (1996) and Besley and Coate (1997). Similarly, we could endoge-
nize the identity of party bosses by presenting an overlapping generations framework in
which party bosses arise from senior politicians. Finally, Persson and Tabellini (2003)
show that electoral rules have signi…cant consequences on the organization of political
parties and on economic policy. To what extent do these di¤erences arise through the
role that political parties play in network formation?
8 Appendix
8.1 Foundation for the atomistic approach
We suppose that in the no-party equilibrium, citizens and politicians decide their opti-
mal demands given the market price and in addition citizens do not take into account
the e¤ect of their demand to the amount of links that the politician has. In this
appendix we give a game theoretic foundation for this approach.
We suppose that the links are created before the politician’s term of o¢ce or the
election. We let the e¤ective strength of the link, ????, be a function not only of the
strength, ??? , but also of the timing of the creation of the link. It is more likely that
the project is passed to someone whom the politician has known for a longer time. If
the …nite but continuous time interval during which links are built is normalized to
one, let ??? be the fraction of time that elapses before link between ? and ? is created.
Then the e¤ective strength of the link is ???? = ???(1¡ ???).
If politicians post take-it or leave-it rewards at each point in time and the pairwise
strengths of the links are settled based on the posted rewards, the emerging market
equilibrium should correspond to the static equilibrium of section 3?
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8.2 Proof of proposition 1
Proof. If all agents of the same type behave identically in aggregate demands and
supplies in equilibrium, the supply of links equals the number agents times the number
of links that each agent forms,
?? = ??????? (17)
On the other hand, the demand for links equals,
?? = ??????? (18)
In equilibrium, the supply of links by ?:s has to equal demand by ? : ?:
?????? = ???
?
??? (19)
Thus, acting atomistically, the probability that a citizen gets a project when she ac-
quires a full link, ???, is ?????? where
??? =
???
??????
=
?
????
(20)
is taken as given. Thus we can sum up the …rst order conditions and write the citizen’s
…rst order condition as
????¡ ???? ¡ ????? = 0? (21)
In a similar manner, we can sum up the politician’s …rst order conditions to get
???? ¡ ????? = 0? (22)
Inserting (19), (20) and (22) into (21) gives
?
????
?¡ ????? ¡ ?
??????
??
= 0?
Inserting ?? = ??? gives
?
????
?¡ ????? ¡ ?
????
?
= 0?
Hence, in equilibrium, a politician’s supply of links equals
???? =
r
???
(? + 1)?
? (23)
From (19), we can solve a citizen’s equilibrium demand for links,
???? =
r
??
?(? + 1)?
? (24)
Therefore, by (22), the equilibrium reward for the link is
? =
r
????
(? + 1)
? (25)
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8.3 Proof of proposition
Proof. The equilibrium payo¤s follow from plugging the equilibrium demand, supply
and reward of the previous proof into the payo¤ functions.
8.4 Proof of proposition 4
Proof. 1) Let us …rst assume that each party has ? citizens for each politician linked
to it. The equilibrium reward must be such that the party is indi¤erent on whether to
sell one additional link or not. Selling one additional link would increase the linking
costs of the politician to whom the citizen would be linked from ?
2
(?+1)2 to ?
2
(?+2)2.
In addition to this, the party would have to pay ?
2
as the new citizen’s linking cost as we
assume that the party bears all linking costs. The marginal increase in the linking costs
then equals ?
2
(2?+4) = ?(?+2). For any party, the net gain that a party would derive
from selling a link to one more citizen cannot be positive, since then it would have an
incentive to deviate and sell a link to an additional citizen. Hence, ???? · ?(? +2)? On
the other hand, it is not possible that the net gain is negative, ???? ? ?(? + 2), since
then each party could increase the reward that a citizen has to pay up to ?(?+2). This
is because for every party ???? · ?(? + 2) and hence no party strictly prefers o¤ering
a link to an additional citizen and the citizen can nothing but remain with her party
even with the higher reward. Thus,
???? = ?(? + 2) (26)
2) Let us now show that given that each party has ??? politicians, the equilibrium
number of citizens is????. Suppose that there are two political parties, ? 0 and ? 00 such
that the number of citizens linked to the two political parties are such that ?
00
??
?00??
?
?0??
?0??
? Then, since all citizens and politicians are linked and ?? = ??? = ????, we
can choose two political parties so that ?
00
??
?00??
? ? ? ?
0
??
?0??
. But then using the cheapest
structure described in point (1) of the proof, for all politicians linked to ? 00 the number
of links ?00 is smaller than or equal to ? + 1. Yet, for the party ? 0 there must be a
politician for whom the number of links ?00 is strictly greater than ? + 1? Hence,
?
2
(?00 + 1) · ?
2
(? + 1) ?
?
2
(?0 + 1) (27)
The reward ?0?? of the party ? 0 must be higher than or equal to (2?0 + 2). Other-
wise, the last additional link does not provide positive pro…t. But for ? 00 the marginal
cost is lower and hence,
?0?? ¸ ?(?0 + 2) ? ?(?00 + 2)
and hence party ? 00 makes pro…t by selling an additional link to a customer of ? 0 with a
cheaper price and the customer has a higher or equal probability of getting the project
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with ? 00 than with ? 0 and this cannot be an equilibrium. We have a contradiction.
Hence, ?
00
??
?00??
=
?0??
?0??
= ?.
3) Let us now show that the equilibrium reward ??? satis…es
???? =
?(?2 + ? ¡ 1)
2
¡ ?
2
(2???? + 1)? (28)
The bene…ts of the party are the payments from all citizens linked to the politicians,
????????? ? The costs include the payment made to the politicians ????????? the linking
costs of politicians paid by political parties, ????
?
2
(? + 1)2, the linking costs of the
citizens linked to the politicians of the party, ?????
?
2
, and the party’s own linking
costs to the politicians ?
2
(????)2. In equilibrium, the marginal bene…t from linking to
political parties must equal its marginal cost, that is
????? =
?
2
? + ???? +
?
2
(? + 1)2 +
?(2???? + 1)
2
(29)
Plugging in from (26), the payment ???? is given by (28).
4) Let us now show that any network structure where for some party, ??? 6=
?, cannot be an equilibrium. Suppose that there are two political parties ? 00 and
? 0 with ?0?? ? ?00??. Then the party ? 00 is not willing to pay more than ?00?? =
?(?2+?¡1)
2
¡ ?
2
(2?00?? + 1) to the politicians linked to it. Otherwise, the last additional
politician would deteriorate ? 00 : ? payo¤. But ? 0 can buy a politician customer of
? 00 with positive pro…t, since
???00? ·
?(?2 + ? ¡ 1)
2
¡ ?
2
(2?00?? + 1) ?
?(?2 + ? ¡ 1)
2
¡ ?
2
(2?0?? + 1)
and ? 0 can a¤ord paying ??? 00?+ ? for ? ? 0 su¢ciently small. Hence, ??? 6= ? cannot
be an equilibrium.
8.5 Proof of proposition 5
Proof. The equilibrium reward ???? follows immediately from part (i) of the proof of
proposition 4 and is given by
???? =
?
2
(?2 + ? ¡ 2?¡ 2) (30)
now follows from plugging ???? = ? into (29) in the proof of proposition 4 and rear-
ranging. By plugging in, we get the equilibrium probability of getting the project
??? = ?
?
??
=
?
?
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8.6 Proof of proposition 9
Proof. The condition for politicians to have higher total surplus with political parties
than without them is ?
2
(?2 + ? ¡ 2?¡ 2) ¸ ???
2(? + 1)
(31)
We can rewrite (31) as
?(?2 + ? ¡ 2?¡ 2) ¸ ???
(? + 1)
??
?
· (?
2 + ? ¡ 2?¡ 2)(? + 1)
?
??
?
· ?2 + ? + ? + 1¡ 2?¡ 2¡ 2?+ 2
?
As we simultaneously have the participation constraint for citizens to read as ?(?+
2) · ??? , political parties prefer a feasible network structure with political parties to a
situation without political parties if
?(? + 2) · ??
?
· ?2 + 2? + 1¡ 2?¡ 2¡ 2?+ 2
?
(32)
For this inequality to hold, it must be that
¡1¡ 2?¡ 2?+ 2
?
¸ 0
This is a contradiction. Therefore, the party equilibrium is not preferred by the politi-
cians.
8.7 Proof of proposition 10
Suppose that
p??
? + 1¡1 is a positive integer. Let us assume that the links built by the
deviating politician (henceworth, ?) ? have to be full links. ? acts as a monopoly with
respect to citizens, making them take-it-or-leave it o¤ers on building links. Citizens
correctly anticipate what is the number of links ? that ? is going to sell.
Anticipating that the number of links that S sells is ?, a citizen who is o¤ered a
link is willing to pay up to ? satisfying
??
?
= ? +
?
2
(1 + 1)2 ¡ ?
2
?
simplifying as ??? = ? +
3?
2
.
The politician’s surplus writes
??¡ ??
2
2
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which is increasing in ? for a given ? and increasing in ? if for a given ? if ? ? ?
2
(2?+1)?
Thus the optimum must satisfy
? =
??
?
¡ 3?
2
? · ?
2
(2?+ 1)
We assumed that parameters ?? ?? and ? are such that ? =
p??
? + 1¡ 1 is an integer.
However, it is easy to check that
p??
? + 1¡1 is a solution to ?2(2?+1) = ??? ¡ 3?2 . Thus
the optimal ? and ? are ?¤ = ??p ??
? +1¡1
¡ 3?
2
and ?¤ =
p??
? + 1¡ 1?
As a consequence, the surplus for S satis…es
?¤?¤ ¡ ?(?
¤)2
2
= (
??
?¤
¡ 3?
2
)?¤ ¡ ?(?
¤)2
2
= ¡?
2
((?¤)2 + 3?¤)
= ¡?
2
(
r
??
?
+ 1¡ 1)((
r
??
?
+ 1¡ 1) + 3)
= ¡?
2
(
??
?
+ 1 +
r
??
?
+ 1¡ 2)
= ¡?
2
(
??
?
¡ 1 +
r
??
?
+ 1)
=
?
2
(
??
?
+ 1¡
r
??
?
+ 1)
Denote ??? = ?. The IC condition is satis…ed if and only if the politician’s party equi-
librium payo¤ is greater than or equal to the payo¤ of remaining not linked to a party.
That is ?
2
(?+ 1¡ p?+ 1) · ?
2
(?2 + ? ¡ 2?¡ 2)
Equivalent to
(?+ 1¡ p?+ 1) · (?2 + ? ¡ 2?¡ 2)
Rearrange
(?+ 1¡ (?2 + ? ¡ 2?¡ 2)) · p?+ 1
both sides are positive since ? ¸ ?2 + ? ¡ 2?¡ 2? Otherwise, citizens would not be
willing to buy links in a party equilibrium. Square
(?+ 1)2 ¡ 2(?+ 1)(?2 + ? ¡ 2?¡ 2) + (?2 + ? ¡ 2?¡ 2)2 · (?+ 1)
and collect the terms with ?+ 1
(?+ 1)[(?+ 1)¡ 1¡ 2(?2 + ? ¡ 2?¡ 2)] + (?2 + ? ¡ 2?¡ 2)2 · 0
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(?+ 1)[?¡ (?2 + ? ¡ 2?¡ 2)]
¡(?+ 1)(?2 + ? ¡ 2?¡ 2)
+(?2 + ? ¡ 2?¡ 2)2
· 0
collect the last two terms with factor (?2 + ? ¡ 2?¡ 2)
(?+ 1)[?¡ (?2 + ? ¡ 2?¡ 2)] + [(?2 + ? ¡ 2?¡ 2)¡ (?+ 1)](?2 + ? ¡ 2?¡ 2) · 0
(?+ 1)[?¡ (?2 + ? ¡ 2?¡ 2)]
+[(?2 + ? ¡ 2?¡ 2)¡ ?](?2 + ? ¡ 2?¡ 2)
¡(?2 + ? ¡ 2?¡ 2)
· 0
collect the …rst two terms with factor [?¡ (?2 + ? ¡ 2?¡ 2)]
[(?+ 1)¡ (?2 + ? ¡ 2?¡ 2)][?¡ (?2 + ? ¡ 2?¡ 2)]¡ (?2 + ? ¡ 2?¡ 2) · 0
Now setting ? = (?2 + ? ¡ 2?¡ 2) will make the expression negative since (?2 + ? ¡
2?¡ 2) ? 0. On the other hand, letting ?! 1 makes the expression positive.
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